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1. Introduction. This paper presents results on the positive implications of two-sided matching theory,
as first developed by Gale and Shapley [10]. The existing applications of the theory have mostly dealt with
normative questions of market design. We develop the testable implications of the theory, and present results
akin to the revealed-preference tests of consumer theory. The tests are formulated in abstract settings, but can be
taken to real data by using identifying assumptions already employed by applied researchers, and can hopefully
serve as the basis for a statistical theory of testing in matching markets.
Two-sided matching models are described by two sets of agents (think of workers and firms, or men and
women) and a preference relation for each agent over potential partners from the opposite set. The theory
studies matchings that have the core property; the core matchings are called “stable.” Matching models have
been studied extensively since Gale and Shapley’s [10] seminal paper: Al Roth’s online bibliography lists close
to 500 papers and can be found at http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/matchbib.html.
The literature has focused on the structure of stable matchings when agents’ preferences are given. Hence, to
test the theory using existing results, one must know the agents’ preferences. We study the problem of which
matchings can be stable when agents’ preferences are unknown. Concretely, given a collection of matchings,
12    k we ask if there are preferences for the agents involved so that all these matchings are stable.
When this is the case, we say that the set of matchings is rationalizable.
The problem is important because it is often difficult to infer agents’ preferences, and it is important to
understand the implications of the theory when preferences are unobserved. One issue is that the theory may not
have testable implications—perhaps all collections of matchings can be rationalized with suitable preferences.
A second issue is, if the theory has testable implications, what are they? Can we characterize the rationalizable
collections of matchings in a way that is useful for empirical work?
In this paper, we show: (1) that the theory is testable, so there are nonrationalizable sets of matchings; and
(2) we provide a series of results, leading up to a characterization of the rationalizable sets of matchings. The
characterization is in graph-theoretic terms. A necessary condition is simply that a certain graph has no odd
cycles. A necessary and sufficient condition is in terms of no odd cycles and a certain integral polynomial
system.
We also obtain some secondary results. The first is that if a collection of matchings is rationalizable, then
it is typically rationalizable by a large number of different preference profiles. Therefore, matching theory is
not exactly identified, in the econometric sense of the term. Second, we consider the problem of when purely
randomly generated matchings would be rationalizable. We show that the probability of rationalizing a fixed
number of random matchings remains bounded away from zero as the number of agents grows. Therefore,
in large populations one needs large samples of matchings for the theory to have power. Third, we discuss
rationalization by an alternative solution concept: von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets (Ehlers [8]).
The rest of the introduction presents a brief description of the nature of the results, and a discussion of how
the results are related to actual empirical work on matching.
The problem of rationalizing matchings is part of a larger research program of studying refutability in eco-
nomics. This program is best known for Samuelson’s [20], Richter’s [18], and Afriat’s [1] theories of revealed
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preference in individual decision making. However, revealed-preference theory does not help in matching prob-
lems. In matching, one can think of the agents as choosing a partner from the opposite side of the market, but
revealed-preference theory has no bite because Agent 1 not choosing Agent 2 does not necessarily mean that
1 is revealed preferred to 2. It can also mean that 2 prefers not to be with 1. Refutability has also been studied
in general-equilibrium theory (e.g., Brown and Matzkin [3] and Brown and Shannon [4]) and noncooperative
game theory (e.g., Ledyard [14], Sprumont [22], Lehrer and Rosenberg [15], Lehrer et al. [16], and Shmaya
[21]), but the results are, again, not useful in matching theory.
There is a distinct source of testable implications in matching theory. The classical results on stable matchings
imply a coincidence of interest within the same side of the market, and opposition of interest across the market.
We show that, essentially, stability is characterized by a version of the coincidence/opposition property that holds
for any pair of matchings. In the classical results, the coincidence/opposition property holds for all agents with
respect to certain matchings, and for all pairs of matchings with respect to certain agents. We show that there is
a coincidence/opposition property that holds for all agents in any pair of matchings; this property characterizes
stability, and it is the source of testable implications in matching theory.
The coincidence/opposition property implies that there are nonrationalizable sets of matchings. We show that
these sets must involve some agents who are matched to the same partner in more than one matching. For this
reason, in empirical tests of the theory, it is crucial to be able to identify some individuals in different matchings
as the same agent. For example, consider data on a cross section of matches between buyers and sellers of
a certain good. Each match corresponds to the outcome in one market, for example, domestic markets for a
good that is not traded internationally. One can then assume that firms with similar observable characteristics
(size, technology) have the same preferences over potential buyers and are considered to be the same by the
buyers. Therefore, one treats the firms with the same observable characteristics as identical agents (and make
an analogous assumption for the buyers).
A well-known result in matching theory is that the set of stable matchings forms a distributive lattice (see
Knuth [13, p. 56], who attributes the result to John Conway). Our results are related to a problem posed by Knuth
on the universe of lattices that can be stable sets of matching markets. Blair [2] gave the first and seemingly
definitive answer to the problem. Blair proves that, for any distributive lattice L, there are sets of men and
women, and a preference profile, so that the resulting set of stable matchings is lattice isomorphic to L. The
interpretation of Blair’s result in the literature is that the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings has
no properties beyond distributivity. However, the lattice structure of stable matchings may still have additional
properties, properties that are not shared by other lattices of matchings. In fact, one can rewrite some of our
results (see the remark after Lemma 4.2) as a characterization of the matching lattices that are stable. Our results
imply that matching lattices have other properties, in addition to distributivity.
2. Statement of the problem.
2.1. Preliminary definitions. In this paper, we use the language of graph theory, but no results from graph
theory. A graph is a pair G= V E
, where V is a set and E is a binary relation on V , i.e., a subset of V ×V .
The set V is called the vertex set of G, and E is the set of edges of G. Say that G is loop free if v v
E, for
all v ∈ V . Say that G is undirected if v v′
 ∈E implies that v′ v
 ∈E, i.e., if E is a symmetric binary relation.
A path is a sequence v1 v2     vK in V with K > 1 and vk vk+1
 ∈ E for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. Say that
v and v′ are connected if there is a path v1 v2     vK with v= v1 and v′ = vK and a path v1 v2     vK with
v= vK and v′ = v1. Say that v and v′ are disconnected if they are not connected. A connected component of G
is a set C ⊂ V such that, for all v v′ ∈ C, v and v′ are connected. The set of all connected components of G
form a partition of V . A cycle is a path v1 v2     vK with v1 = vK .
2.2. The model. Let M and W be disjoint, finite sets. We call men the elements of M and women the
elements of W . A matching is a function  M ∪W →M ∪W ∪  such that for all w ∈W and m ∈M ,
(i) w
 ∈M ∪ ,
(ii) m
 ∈W ∪ , and
(iii) m=w
 if and only if w=m
.
Denote the set of all matchings by . The notation a
= has the interpretation that a is unmatched in 
(she/he is single), whereas w=m
 denotes that m and w are matched in .
Echenique: Testable Implications of Matching Theory
Mathematics of Operations Research 33(3), pp. 757–768, © 2008 INFORMS 759
A preference relation is a linear, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation. A preference relation for a
man m ∈M , denoted Pm
, is understood to be over the set W ∪ . Similarly, Pw
, for w ∈W , denotes a
preference relation over M ∪. A preference profile is a list P of preference relations for men and women, i.e.,
P = Pm

m∈M Pw

w∈W 

Note that no man or woman is indifferent over two different partners; preferences with this property are usually
called strict.
Denote by Rm
 the weak version of Pm
, so w′Rm
w if w′ = w or w′Pm
w. The definition of Rw
 is
analogous.
Fix a preference profile P . Say that a matching  is individually rational if, for any m and w, m
Rm

and w
Rw
. Say that a pair wm
 blocks  if w = m
, wPm
m
, and mPw
w
. A matching
is stable if it is individually rational and there is no pair that blocks it. Denote by SP
 the set of all stable
matchings.
This model was first studied in Gale and Shapley [10]; see Roth and Sotomayor [19] for an exposition of the
theory. It should be clear that one can adapt the definition of the core as a solution for this model, and that the
set of stable matchings coincides with the core.
2.3. Statement of the problem. Let  = 1    K be a set of matchings ( ⊆). The problem we
study is: When is there a preference profile P such that  ⊂ SP
. We shall say that  can be rationalized when
this is the case, and that P rationalizes  . In the introduction we relate rationalizability to actual empirical tests
of matching theory.
Note that we assume that the same sets of agents are involved in each of the matchings in  . In Echenique [6],
we discuss the consequences of relaxing this assumption.
Assume that M and W have the same number of elements, and that m
 =  and w
 = , for all m and w,
and for all  ∈  . This assumption is without loss of generality for the purpose of studying rationalizability.
The reason is that if  is rationalizable, then the single agents must be the same for all the matchings in  (see
Roth and Sotomayor [19]), and we can therefore ignore them and assume that the number of men and women
is the same. Note that this model allows agents to be single (as is standard in matching theory); we are only
assuming that the given matchings in  have no single agents.
We start with two very simple motivating results. The first (Proposition 2.1) is that not all matchings can be
rationalized, so there is potential for refuting matching theory. The second (Proposition 2.2) says that the source
of refutability is quite specific: that some agents match with the same partner in different matchings.
Proposition 2.1. If M  ≥ 3, then  is not rationalizable.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is P with  ⊂ SP
. Let M =
∨
SP
 and W =∧
SP
 be the men-optimal and women-optimal stable matchings, respectively (Gale and Shapley [10]). Because
M  = W  ≥ 3, there is a pair mw
 such that m =Mw
 and w =Wm
.
Let ′ ∈ be such that ′m
=Wm
 and ′w
=Mw
. There is a matching ′′ such that ′′m
=w.
Because  ⊆ SP
, and ′′m
 = Wm
, w = ′′m
Pm
Wm
. Similarly, mPw
Mw
. Then mw

blocks ′. Therefore, ′  SP
, which contradicts that ⊂ SP
. 
Proposition 2.2. If, for all m, im
 =jm
 for all ij ∈ with i = j , then  is rationalizable.
Proof. For each m, define Pm
 by: w′Pm
w if and only if there is ij ∈ with im
=w′jm
=w
and i < j; set Pm
w if w =m
, for all  ∈ , and order arbitrarily these w with Pm
w.
For each w, define Pw
 by: m′Pw
m if and only if there is ij ∈ with iw
=m′jw
=m, and
i > j; set Pw
m if m =w
, for all  ∈ , and order arbitrarily these w with Pm
w.
Let P be the resulting preference profile. It is clear that all matchings in  are individually rational under P .
In addition, for any mw
 and  ∈ with m =w
, wPm
m
 implies that w
Pw
m, so there can be
no blocking pair of . Therefore  ⊂ SP
. 
The following example shows that the preferences constructed in the proof of Proposition 2.2 do not imply
 = SP
. A rationalizing preference profile will typically give  as a proper subset of SP
. Example 5.1
presents a more subtle instance of an  that is a proper subset of SP
, for any rationalizing P .1
1 The question of which  satisfy  = SP
 for some P is also interesting, but seems to require different arguments than we have used
here.
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Example 2.1. Let M = m1m2m3m4 and W = w1w2w3w4. Consider the matchings 1 and 2
defined as:
m1 m2 m3 m4
1 w1 w2 w3 w4
2 w2 w1 w4 w3
Then the matching that matches m1 and m2 as in 1, and m3 and m4 as in 2, is also stable for the preferences
constructed in the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Note that, in fact, there are no rationalizing preferences for which 1 and 2 are the only stable matchings:
the cases not covered by Proposition 2.2 by relabeling the matchings are the cases where m1 and m2 prefer one
of the two matchings whereas m3 and m4 prefer the other; for example, m1 and m2 prefer their partner in 1
over 2 whereas m3 and m4 prefer their partner in 2 over 1. In that case, however, the matching described
above, matching m1 and m2 as in 1, and m3 and m4 as in 2, is also stable.
Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 say that some collections of matchings are not rationalizable, and that failures
of rationalizability arise from having some agents match with the same partner in more than one matching.
However, there is too much slack between the cases covered by Propositions 2.1 and 2.2: Everything cannot be
rationalized and matchings where all agents have unique partners can be rationalized. As bounds on what can
be rationalized, these are too coarse. In the rest of the paper, we present increasingly tighter results, building
up to a characterization of the sets of matching that can be rationalized. The next section presents an example
illustrating why one may fail to rationalize a set of matchings.
3. An illustration. Here we present a simple example that illustrates the ideas behind the results in the
paper. Consider the following example, with four men, four women, and three matchings.
Let us construct preferences that would rationalize  = 123. We can consider all women that a man
is never matched to as unacceptable. For example, set Pm1
w3 and Pm1
w4. To do this can only help
in rationalizing  : It eliminates the need to check for blocks by agents who are not matched in any of the
matchings in  . The issue, then, is how to specify preferences among the men’s partners in 1, 2, and 3.
m1 m2 m3 m4
1 w1 w2 w3 w4
2 w1 w3 w4 w2
3 w2 w3 w1 w4
Start with how men could rank their partners in 1 and 2. For m1, the rank is trivial because 1m1
 =
2m1
. Next, consider m2, and let us say (arbitrarily) that w3 = 2m2
Pm2
1m2
 = w2. Next, con-
sider m3. Could we have that 1m3
Pm3
2m3
? No, because it would imply that 1 and 2 cannot both
be stable: m3w3
 blocks 2 if m3Pw3
m2, and m2w3
 blocks 1 if m2Pw3
m3. Hence, saying that
1m3
Pm3
2m3
 presents a problem, regardless of what we assume about Pw3
. Therefore, if we are to
rationalize  , we have that 2m2
Pm2
1m2
 implies 2m3
Pm3
1m3
.
Suppose then that 2m2
Pm2
1m2
 and 2m3
Pm3
1m3
. Now 2m3
=1m4
, so m3 and m4 are
in the same situation as m2 and m3. Hence, 2m3
Pm3
1m3
 implies that 2m4
Pm4
1m4
, by the same
argument as in the previous paragraph. Therefore, the men m2, m3, and m4 must agree on how they compare
their partners in 1 and 2. Note that the result would be the same if we had started with 1m2
Pm2
2m2

instead of 2m2
Pm2
1m2
.
More generally, the lattice structure on SP
 lies behind agreement of any two men who are related by relation
“m’s partner in 1 is m
′’s partner in 2.” Note that 1 ∨ 2, obtained by giving each man his best partner
in 1 and 2, in SP
 is a matching. Therefore, 2m2
Pm2
1m2
 implies 2m3
Pm3
1m3
, or both
m2 and m3 would be assigned 2m2
 as partner in 1 ∨2, and then 1 ∨2 would not be a matching. The
general result is: For any two matchings, i and j , all the men mm
′
 who stand in the relation “m’s partner
in i is m
′’s partner in j” must agree on how they rank their partners in i and j .
The following diagram presents a graph among the men for each pair of matchings in  . For example, the
graph corresponding to 1 and 2 has M as the vertex set and (directed) edges given by the relation that one
man’s partner in 1 is the related man’s partner in 2. So, there is an edge m2→m4 because 1m2
=2m4
;
there is an edge m3→m2 because 1m3
=2m2
, and so on.
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m1 m2 m4m3
m2 m4m3
m2 m4m3
m1
m1
µ1 – µ2:
µ1 – µ3:
µ2 – µ3:
The graph corresponding to 1 − 2 has two connected components, m1 and C = m2m3m4. By our
previous argument, all the men in C must agree on how they rank their partners in 1 and 2. Similarly, reading
the corresponding connected components from the diagram, all the men in C ′ = m1m2m3 must agree on 1
and 3, and all the men in C
′′ = m1m3m4 must agree on 2 and 3.
It is clear how this argument restricts the possible preference profiles that might rationalize  , but it does not
by itself give a criterion for deciding that  is not rationalizable. The criterion arises from the presence of men
who have the same partner in different matchings.
Assume that 2m
Pm
1m
 for all m ∈ C. Because m2 ∈ C, and 2m2
 = 3m2
, we must have that
3m2
Pm2
1m2
. However, m2 ∈C ′, so 3m
Pm
1m
 for all m ∈C ′. Similarly, m4 ∈C with 1m4
=
3m4
, so 2m4
Pm
1m2
 now implies that 2m
Pm
3m
 for all m ∈ C ′′. The problem is that m1 ∈
C ′ ∩C ′′, so we would need that
2m1
Pm1
3m1
Pm1
1m1

This is a violation of the antisymmetry of Pm1
, as 2m1
=1m1
. Hence,  is not rationalizable.
The idea—which is formalized below—is that the presence of men with the same partner in different match-
ings gives a relation between objects such as C, C ′, and C ′′. These relations must satisfy a consistency condition
for  to be rationalizable.
4. Preferences over partners in pairs of matchings. The discussion in §3 suggests that two objects are
important in studying rationalizability. The first is the set of connected components obtained from pairs of
matchings in  , which we denote by C below. The second is the relation between connected components in C,
derived from having agents with the same partners in two different matchings. In this section we describe the
connected components, and show how these capture the essence of stability.
Fix a pair of matchings i and j in  . Consider the (directed) graph for which M is the vertex set and
Eij
 is the set of edges, defined by: mm
′
 ∈Eij
 if and only if im
=jm′
. Denote by Cij

the set of all connected components of MEij

. See §3 for examples of these.
There is an analogous graph with the women as vertexes: Let WF ij

 be the graph for which the
vertex set is the set of women, and where ww′
 ∈ F ij
 if jw
 = iw′
. A first result relates the
women’s graph and the men’s graph (its proof is trivial and thus omitted).
Lemma 4.1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) C is a connected component of MEij

;
(ii) iC
, the image of C through i, is a connected component of WF ij

.
In addition, if C is a connected component of MEij

, then C is a cycle, and jC
=iC
.
Lemma 4.2. Let  be rationalized by preference profile P . If ij ∈ , and C ∈Cij
, then either (1)
or (2) hold:
im
Pm
jm
 for all m ∈C and jw
Pw
iw
 for all w ∈iC
 (1)
jm
Pm
im
 for all m ∈C and iw
Pw
jw
 for all w ∈iC
 (2)
Further, if P is a preference profile such that for all ij ∈ , and C ∈Cij
, either (1) or (2) hold, and
in addition
Pm
w if and only if w  m
  ∈
Pw
m if and only if m w
  ∈
then P rationalizes  .
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Remark 4.1. The first statement in Lemma 4.2 is a refinement of the classical results on opposition and
coincidence of interest in matching markets. The classical results say that the agents on the same side of the
market agree, and agents on opposite sides disagree, on their preferences among certain pairs of matchings.
There may still be men, for example, who disagree on the ranking of two matchings, but they must be in different
components (see Example 5.1, where certain men must disagree in any rationalizing preference profile).
The first part of Lemma 4.2 says that this coincidence/opposition holds for any pair of matchings within the
connected components of the corresponding graph. Using the lattice structure on SP
 (Knuth [13]), it can be
restated as follows. If P rationalizes  , then for any C ∈Cij
, either (3) or (4) must hold:
i ∧j
C =iC and i ∨j
C =j C (3)
i ∧j
C =j C and i ∨j
C =iC (4)
The second part of the lemma says that this opposition and coincidence is all that stability requires—up to
the ability to construct well-defined preferences with the opposition and coincidence property. As we show in
the rest of the paper, to construct such preferences is not trivial.
These components of MEij

 are also used by Irving and Leather [11] (see also Roth and
Sotomayor [19, §3.2]), and in a recent paper on the assignment game by Nuñez and Rafels [17]. Irving and
Leather construct certain graphs from given preference profiles, and use the resulting cycles to find new stable
matchings. When a stable matching is found, Irving and Leather’s components coincide with ours. Nuñez and
Rafels use them to study the dimension of the core of the assignment game.
Proof. We prove the first statement. If C is a singleton, there is nothing to prove. Assume, then, that C has
two or more elements. Note that C is a cycle, C = m1    mL, with mlml+1
 ∈ Eij
 (modulo L) for
l= 1    L. This is because for each m ∈M there is a unique m′ ∈ C with m′m
 ∈ Eij
 and a unique
m′′ ∈C with mm′′
 ∈Eij
.
Now, say that im
l
Pml
jm
l
 for some l. We shall prove that im
Pm
jm
 for all m ∈ C. Now
SP
 has a lattice structure (Knuth [13]), and i∨j
 is obtained by letting i∨j
m
 be the best, according
to Pm
, of im
 and jm
. Then, i ∨j
ml
= iml
. Now we must have iml+1
Pml+1
jml+1
,
because jm
l+1
Pml+1
iml+1
 would imply that
i ∨j
ml+1
=jml+1
=iml
= i ∨j
ml

and i ∨j would not be a matching. The result that im
Pm
jm
 for all m ∈C follows by induction.
Let w ∈iC
. We must have that iw
 =jw
 or the component of WF ij

 that w is in would be a
singleton and would not coincide with iC
 (Lemma 4.1). Now we show that jw
Pw
iw
: If we instead
have iw
Pw
jw
, then iw
w
 would block j , because iw
 ∈C, and thus wPiw

jiw

.
Therefore, we have established that im
l
Pml
jm
l
 for some l implies statement (1) of the lemma. The
argument that jm
l
Pml
jm
l
 for some l implies that statement (2) is analogous.
We now prove the second part of the lemma. Let  ∈  . It is clear that  is individually rational by the
requirement on P . Let w and m be such that wPm
m
. Let i and j be such that w = im
 and = j .
There must exist such an i because Pm
w if w is not m’s partner in some matching in  . Let C ∈Cij

with m ∈C. Then w ∈iC
 and, by statement (1) of the lemma, jw
Pw
iw
=m. Hence, mw
 is not
a blocking pair. Because mw
 was arbitrary,  is stable. 
5. Relations between components, and a necessary condition for rationalization. The discussion in §3
suggests that there are relations between components of the pairwise graphs, relations that come from the
presence of some agents who are matched with the same partner in two (or more) matchings. The discussion
also suggests that the rationalizability of  depends on the restrictions imposed by those relations. Here we
define the relations and show how they give a simple necessary condition for  to be rationalizable.
Let C be the set of all nonsingleton elements of Cij
, for any two distinct ij ∈ with i < j . That is,
C= C ⊂M C ≥ 2 and ∃ij
 s.t. i < j and C ∈Cij

Note that a set may be a connected component of more than one graph MEij

. If a set C is in Cij

and in Chk
, we abuse notation and regard each “copy” of C as a different element of C. As a result, for
each C ∈C there is a unique pair ij
 such that C ∈Cij
. This abuse does not, we believe, confuse,
and makes the notation lighter.
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We define two binary relations on the elements of C, and denote them by  and . The meaning of the
relations is as follows. We can regard C and C ′ (in C) as equivalent if they share one matching in the pair
generating the graphs of which they are components, and there is an agent in C ∩C ′ with the same partner in
the differing matchings. We write C  C ′ or C  C ′ depending on which of the matchings is the same, and
which has an agent with the same partner:  checks whether starting from i, the other two indexes j and k
are on the same side of i, i.e., whether both j < i and k < i or both j > i and k > i;  checks whether i is
in-between j and k.
Definition 5.1 (). Let CC ′ ∈ C. Say that C  C ′ if there are three distinct numbers, i, j , and k, in
12    K, such that either
• C ∈Cij
 and C ′ ∈Cik
 or C ∈Cji
 and C ′ ∈Cki
, and
• there is m ∈C ∩C ′ with jm
=km
.
Definition 5.2 (). Let CC ′ ∈ C. Say that C  C ′ if there are three distinct numbers, i, j , and k, in
12    K, such that either
• C ∈Cij
 and C ′ ∈Cki
 or C ∈Cji
 and C ′ ∈Cik
, and
• there is m ∈C ∩C ′ with jm
=km
.
Let E be the set of pairs CC ′
 with CC ′ and let E be the set of pairs CC ′
 with CC ′. Therefore,
E is another notation for the binary relation  and E is the binary relation . This duplicate notation is
useful.
Now, CE ∪E
 represents the (undirected) graph with vertex set C, and where there is an edge between
C and C ′ if either CC ′ or CC ′. Note that CE ∪E
 is loop free because both  and  are irreflexive.
Theorem 5.1. If  is rationalizable, then CE ∪E
 can have no cycle with an odd number of  edges.
Theorem 5.1 follows from Lemma 5.1 below. The idea behind the theorem is simple: Each C ∈C is “oriented”
by whether the men in C prefer the first or the second matching in the pairwise graph from which C is taken.
The  relation preserves the orientation, whereas  reverses it. Hence, there cannot be a cycle with an odd
number of s.
Remark 5.1. The necessary condition in Theorem 5.1 can be checked in polynomial time. Note that the
pairwise graphs MEij

 can be constructed in time polynomial in the number of agents. The absence of
odd cycles is equivalent to the graph (of the equivalence classes of ) being bipartite, and this can be checked
in linear time.
The following example illustrates the use of the pairwise graphs and relations  and . It also presents an
instance of an  for which there is no rationalizing preference profile P with  = SP
.2
Example 5.1. Let M = m1m2m3m4m5 and W = w1w2w3w4w5. Let  = 123 be
defined as:
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5
1 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
2 w1 w3 w2 w5 w4
3 w3 w2 w5 w1 w4
Note that
C13
= m2 m1m3m4m5
C23
= m5 m1m2m3m4
C12
= m1 m2m3 m4m5
Write C13 and C23 for the nonsingleton elements of C13
 and C23
, respectively. Write C
1
12 for the
m2m3 element, and C
2
12 for m4m5, of C12
.
Then 1m1
=2m1
 implies that C13C23, 1m2
=3m2
 implies C23C112, and 2m5
=3m5

implies C13C212. These are all the relations among components. Note that there are no cycles:
C212C13C23C112
Let P be a rationalizing profile. Because C13 C23, all men must either prefer their partner in 1 over 3
and 2 over 3, or prefer 3 over 1 and 3 over 2. Without loss of generality, suppose the first case holds.
2 Example 2.1 is another instance, but it is not very subtle because it essentially involves two separate two-men, two-women matchings.
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Then C212  C13 implies that m4 and m5 prefer their partner in 1 over 2, and C23  C112 implies that m2
and m3 prefer their partner in 2 over 1. However, then one can check that the matching 
′ must be stable
for P , where ′ is:
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5
′ w1 w3 w2 w4 w5
Example 5.2. Consider an example with four men and four women, and  = 12, where 1 and 2
are the first two matchings in §3. Clearly,  is rationalizable; the preferences where all men rank their partner
in 1 over their partner in 2, and women have the opposite preferences, rationalize  . As we have seen,
though, when we add matching 3 in §3, the resulting set of matchings cannot be rationalized. One way of
understanding the effect of adding 3 is that one cannot add it on top of 1 and 2 in the men’s preferences
because then 3m2
Pm2
1m2
Pm2
2m2
, whereas 3m2
= 2m2
; one cannot add it below 1 and
2 because then 1m4
Pm4
2m4
Pm4
3m4
, whereas 1m4
=3m4
, and so on.
In light of Lemma 4.2, Theorem 5.1 expresses the requirement that the coincidence/opposition of interest
property be consistent with the connections across components implied by the agents for whom two matchings
are the same. The theorem does not guarantee that the components and the relations between components are
compatible with well-defined preferences.
A first requirement of the compatibility with well-behaved preferences is that C, E, and E cannot imply
intransitivity. We express this requirement by making  a larger relation: We define a monotone-increasing
sequence Ek, and work with the larger binary relation D =
⋃
k=1E
k
. Let E
0
 =E. Given Ek, for k≥ 0, let
Ek+1 be those edges CC
′
 between elements in C such that either CC ′
 ∈ Ek and/or there are i j h andC ∈C with C ∩ C ∩C ′ =  such that C ∈Cij
 and either (i) or (ii) hold:
(i) i < j < h, C ∈Cjh
, C ′ ∈Cih
, and C and C are connected in CEk−1 
,
(ii) i < h < j , C ∈Chj
, C ′ ∈Cih
, and there is a path in CEk−1 ∪E
 between C and C with
an odd number of s.
Let D =
⋃
k=1E
k
. Note that D = EL, for some L≥ 1, as the sequence of Ek is monotone increasing and
C is finite.
Theorem 5.2. If  is rationalizable, then CD ∪E
 can have no cycle with an odd number of  edges.
The proof of Theorem 5.2 is below.
Let  be rationalizable. Define the function d C→ −11 as follows. For each C ∈ C, let i, j be such
that C ∈Cij
. Say that dC
= 1 if ∀m ∈C
im
Pm
jm

 and −1 otherwise. Note that Lemma 4.2
says that all m ∈C must agree on their preferences over im
 and jm
.
Lemma 5.1. Let  be rationalizable and C1    CN 
 be a cycle in CE ∪E
. Then, for each n and L,
modN ,
dCn
=%Ll=n−1
1ClCl+1dCL
 (5)
Proof. Let P rationalize  . We only prove the case L = n+ 1; the result then follows by induction. Let
CnCn+1. There are i, j , and k such that (say) Cn ∈Cij
 and Cn+1 ∈Cik
. There is m∗ ∈Cn ∩Cn+1
with jm
∗
= km∗
, so im∗
Pm∗
jm∗
 if and only if im∗
Pm∗
km∗
. Because m∗ ∈ Cn ∩Cn+1,
Lemma 4.2 implies
∀m ∈Cn
im
Pm
jm

 iff ∀m ∈Cn+1
im
Pm
km


Hence, dCn
= dCn+1
; similarly, when Cn ∈Cji
 and Cn+1 ∈Cki
.
On the other hand, when Cn  Cn+1 and i j , and k are such that Cn ∈ Cij
 and Cn+1 ∈ Cki
,
the existence of m∗ ∈ Cn ∩ Cn+1 with jm∗
 = km∗
 implies (Lemma 4.2) that dCn
 = 1 if and only if
dCn+1
=−1. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Lemma 5.1 implies Theorem 5.1 because any cycle C1    CN with an odd num-
ber of s implies that dC1
= −1
dC1
. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let  be rationalizable by the preference profile P . We prove Theorem 5.2 by
induction. By Theorem 5.1, CE ∪ E
 = CE0 ∪ E
 can have no cycle with an odd number of .
Lemma 5.1 implies that the formula (5) holds in CE0 ∪E
. Suppose this statement is true of CEk ∪E
;
if we prove that it is true of CEk+1 ∪E
, then the proof of the theorem is done.
Echenique: Testable Implications of Matching Theory
Mathematics of Operations Research 33(3), pp. 757–768, © 2008 INFORMS 765
Let CC ′
 ∈ Ek+1 \Ek. We shall prove that dC
= dC ′
. Let i j h, and C ∈ C with C ∩ C ∩ C ′ =  be
such that C ∈Cij
 is in the situation described by item (i) or item (ii). Suppose that they are in the situa-
tion described by item (i). Because C and C are connected in CEk−1 
, by Lemma 5.1, we have dC
= d C
.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that dC
 = 1. Let m ∈ C ∩ C ′ ∩ C; then dC
 = d C
 = 1 implies
im
Pm
jm
 and jm
Pm
hm
. Therefore, im
Pm
hm
, and we must have dC
′
= dC
. Sup-
pose now we are in the situation described by item (ii). The existence of a path with an odd number of s
connecting C and C implies that dC
 = d C
. Suppose, without loss of generality, that dC
= 1. Let m ∈C ∩
C ′ ∩ C; then 1= dC
 = d C
 implies im
Pm
jm
 and jm
Pm
hm
. Therefore, im
Pm
hm

and we must have dC ′
= dC
.
Now, because dC ′
= dC
 for all CC ′
 ∈Ek+1 \Ek, and holds in CEk∪E
, (5) holds in CEk+1 ∪E
.
Then CEk+1 ∪E
 has no cycles with an odd number of s. 
6. A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalization. The graph CD ∪ E
 captures some of
the requirements put by well-defined preferences, but not all of them. In this section we express the remaining
requirements as a system of polynomial inequalities. The idea is that C ∈ Cij
 be assigned a value of 1
if all m ∈ C prefer i over j and value −1 if they prefer j . It is then simple to control the transitivity of
preferences by controlling the values one can assign to the different Cs. The result is a characterization of the
 that can be rationalized.
The characterization poses the question of when the rationalizing P is unique; in econometrics such a sit-
uation is called exact
 identification. It is easy to show (Proposition 6.1) that, when  is rationalizable, the
rationalizing P will generally not be unique.3
A first step in the characterization is that all C and C ′ that are connected in CD
 must have the same
value, so we can treat them as the same object. Let  be the set of all connected components of CD
. Let

 be the graph that has  as the vertex set, and where ′
 ∈  if there is C ∈  and C ′ ∈ ′ with
C C ′.
If CD ∪E
 has no cycle with an odd number of s, 
 is a well-defined loop-free graph: For any
two C and C ′ in the same component  ∈ it cannot be that C C ′, because there is a path from C to C ′ in
CD
 and C C ′ would imply a cycle with exactly one .
Let B be a ternary relation on  defined as follows: ′′′
 ∈ B if there are i, j , and h, i < j < h, and
C ∈ ∩Cij
, C ′ ∈′ ∩Cjh
, and C ′′ ∈′′ ∩Cih
 with C ∩C ′ ∩C ′′ = . A triple ′′′

stands in relation B if its components have nonempty intersection, and correspond to three pairwise graphs, with
indexes i j , j h and i h, and i < jh.
Theorem 6.1.  is rationalizable if and only if CD ∪E
 has no cycle with an odd number of  edges,
and for the resulting graph 
, there is a function d → −11 that satisfies:
(i) ′ ⇒ d
+d′
= 0,
(ii) ′′′
 ∈ B⇒ d
+d′

d′′
≥ 0
Further, there is a rationalizing preference profile for each function d satisfying i
 and ii
.
Proof. We only prove the “if” statement; “only if” is straightforward given the results in the previous
section. Let CD ∪E
 have no cycle with an odd number of s, and let d be a function in the conditions
of the theorem. Abusing notation, interpret d as defined on C by letting d
= dC
 for all C ∈. Note that
for all C there is some  C.
For each m ∈M , construct preferences Pm
 by setting Pm
w for all w  m
  ∈ , wPm
 for
all w ∈ m
  ∈ , and im
Pm
jm
 if either i < j and dC
= 1 for C ∈ Cij
 with C m, or
j < i and dC
=−1 for C ∈Cji
 with C m.
For each w ∈W , define Pw
 by Pw
m for all m w
  ∈, mPw
 for all m ∈ w
  ∈,
and iw
Pm
jw
 if either i < j and diC

 = −1 for iC
 ∈ Cij
 with iC
  iw
 or j < i
and diC

 = 1 for iC
 ∈ Cji
 with iC
  im
. Extend Pm
 and Pw
 arbitrarily to pairs of
agents that are ranked below .
Note that Pm
 and Pw
 are antisymmetric. We show that Pm
 is transitive. The proof that Pw
 is transitive
is analogous. Let im
Pm
jm
, and jm
Pm
hm
. We shall prove that im
Pm
hm
.
Case 1. Let i < j < h, m ∈ C ∈ Cij
, m ∈ C ′ ∈ Cjh
, and m ∈ C ′′ ∈ Cih
. Note that
im
Pm
jm
 implies dC
 = 1 and jm
Pm
hm
 implies dC ′
 = 1. If C and C ′ are connected
in CD
, then, by the construction of D, C and C ′′ are also connected. Therefore, (5) implies that
3 Another interesting question (posed by an anonymous referee) is if there is a rationalizing P such that SP
 is minimal.
Echenique: Testable Implications of Matching Theory
766 Mathematics of Operations Research 33(3), pp. 757–768, © 2008 INFORMS
dC ′′
= dC
= 1; thus, im
Pm
hm
. Now let C and C ′ not be connected in CD
. If C and C ′′ are
connected, then there is nothing to prove, because (5) gives dC ′′
= dC
= 1 and im
Pm
hm
. Similarly,
we obtain im
Pm
hm
 if C
′ and C ′′ are connected. Suppose then that C, C ′, and C ′′ are not connected
in CD
. Let ′′′ ∈  be such that C ∈ C ′ ∈ ′ and C ′′ ∈ ′′; , ′, and ′′ are all different
because C, C ′, and C ′′ are disconnected. Because m ∈ ∩′ ∩′′, ′′′
 ∈ B. Now, dC
= dC ′
= 1
implies d
 = d′
 = 1, so item (ii) of the theorem requires that 2dC ′′
 ≥ 0; i.e., dC ′′
 = 1. Hence,
im
Pm
hm
.
The argument in Case 1 also yields that,
i < j < h
jm
Pm
im

hm
Pm
jm



implies hm
Pm
im
 (6)
This gives us im
Pm
hm
 in the case h< j < i by applying (6) to i
′ j ′ h′
 defined as i′ = h, j ′ = j , and
h′ = i.
Case 2. Let i < h< j , m ∈C ∈Cij
, m ∈C ′ ∈Chj
, and m ∈C ′′ ∈Cih
. Therefore, dC
= 1
and dC ′
=−1.
First, if C  C ′′ we have dC
= dC ′′
, so there is nothing to prove. Suppose, then, that C  C ′′ is false.
It cannot be that C ′  C ′′, because that would imply C ′  C by the construction of D, and dC ′
 = dC

implies that C ′ and C are disconnected in CD
. Therefore, it must be the case that all of C, C ′, and C ′′ are
disconnected in CD
. Let ′′′ ∈ be as in Case 1. Then C ′′C ′C
 ∈ B. By item (ii) of the theorem,
dC ′′
 must satisfy dC ′′
− 1
≥ 0, so dC ′′
= 1 and im
Pm
hm
.
The argument in Case 2 also covers the case h< i < j , by a reasoning similar to the one for h< j < i at the
end of Case 1.
Case 3. Let j < i < h, m ∈ C ∈ Cji
, m ∈ C ′ ∈ Cjh
, and m ∈ C ′′ ∈ Cih
. Now we have
dC
=−1 and dC ′
= 1. First, if C ′ C ′′, then dC ′′
= 1, so there is nothing to prove. Second, it cannot be
that C C ′′, because that would imply C C ′ by the construction of D, and dC ′
 = dC
 implies that C ′
and C are disconnected in CD
. Let ′′′ ∈ be as in Case 1. Then CC ′′C ′
 ∈ B. By item (ii) of
the theorem, dC ′
 must satisfy dC ′′
− 1
≥ 0. Therefore, dC ′′
= 1 and im
Pm
hm
.
The argument in Case 3 also covers the case j < h< i by a reasoning similar to the one in Case 1.
We show that all  ∈ are stable under the constructed preferences. Let  ∈ . It is clear that  is individually
rational. Let w and m be such that wPm
m
. Let i and j be such that w = jm
 and = i. There must
exist such a j because Pm
w if w is not m’s partner in any matching in  . Without loss of generality, say
that i < j . Let C ∈Cij
 with m ∈C, so dC
=−1. Then w ∈iC
, so the construction of Pw
 implies
that iw
Pw
jw
. Therefore, im
Pw
m, and hence mw
 cannot block . 
Finally, we show that matching theory is generally not exactly identified. If  is rationalizable, there are
generally many different preference relations that rationalize it. The source of the different preferences is that, if
m is not matched to w in any matching in  , then the data in  contains very little information on m’s standing
in w’s preference relation.
Let ua be the number of agents that a is not matched to in any matching in  . Note that ua counts men if a
is a woman and women if a is a man. Say that two preference profiles are essentially different if there is at least
one agent on which the preference for two acceptable partners is different.
Proposition 6.1. If  is rationalizable, then it is rationalizable by at least
M 2M %m∈Mum%w∈Wuw

different preference profiles, of which at least
%m∈MumM  − um
%w∈MuwM  − uw

are essentially different.
For example, suppose there are 20 men and women, and that each agent is matched to 10 agents in some
matching in  . If  is rationalizable, it is rationalizable by at least 1080 essentially different preference profiles.
Proof. Let P rationalize  such that any unmatched agents are considered unacceptable. Fix a man m. For
each w that m is not matched to in any matching in  , we can modify P by setting Pw
m and vary Pm
 by
placing w in any of the possible W  (=M ) places in the ranking of m’s preferences (or W −um places in the
ranking among m acceptable partners for the second calculation). This will not change the fact that all  ∈ 
are individually rational, and the only blocking pair it could give rise to is mw
, but having set Pw
m
guarantees that mw
 will not be a blocking pair. 
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7. Rationalization as a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. We have restricted our attention to the
rationalization of the matchings in  as stable matchings, but one could study other solution concepts as well. We
discuss briefly the rationalization by von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets; the first study of these in matching
theory is Ehlers [8].4
Fix a set of men, M , and women, W , and a preference profile P . Say that a matching ′ dominates a
matching  if there is a pair mw
 ∈ M × W with w = ′m
, wPm
m
, and mPw
w
. A set of
matchings V ⊆ is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if (a) no matching in V dominates another matching
in V , and (b) if  ∈ \V , then there is a ′ ∈ V which dominates .
Proposition 7.1. If  is rationalizable, then it is rationalizable by a P such that SP
 is a von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable set.
Proof. Let  be rationalizable. Then it is rationalizable by a preference profile P in which, for any man m,
a woman w is unacceptable if she is not matched to him in any matching in —similarly, for women. We argue
that SP
 is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set: By Theorem 1 in Ehlers [8], a set V is a von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable set if, for any  ∈ V , there is no pair of agents who are matched in some matching in V and
who would block . For any matching with the constructed preferences, a block must be a block of agents who
are matched in some matching in  , because any other pair would be mutually unacceptable. Therefore, SP

is the set of matchings that are not blocked by pairs of agents who are matched in  . In addition, the matchings
in SP
 are individually rational, so with the constructed P they must have agents matched to partners they are
matched with in some matching in  . Hence, SP
 is a stable set by Theorem 1 in Ehlers [8]. 
Proposition 7.1 implies that the notion of rationalizing by a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set is weaker
than rationalization by stable matchings, and leads to another use of Theorem 6.1, which then provides preference
profiles under which one obtains a rationalization by von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets.
The proposition follows very obviously from setting agents as unacceptable when they are not partners in a
matching in  . Similarly, if  is not rationalizable by preferences with this property, it will not be a subset
of a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set for any such preferences. However, it could be in a stable set for
preferences where unmatched agents are acceptable.
8. Probability of rationalizing. The results on rationalizability have some implications for the statistical
“power” of matching theory. Power refers here to how likely it is that purely random outcomes will look as if
they were generated by the theory, i.e., how likely it is that one can rationalize random matchings.
We show that, for a fixed number of observed matchings in a large population, the probability of rationalizing
purely random matchings is bounded away from zero. The result says that large populations require large sample
sizes, which is probably not surprising.
Let Mn be a set of men and Wn a set of women, each with n elements. Let n be the resulting set of possible
matchings with no single agents. Endow n with the uniform distribution, and consider sets k of k matchings
chosen independently at random from n. That is, k is a random set of matchings obtained by choosing k
matchings from n, where each possible k-tuple of matchings has the same probability of being selected.
Proposition 8.1. If k is fixed,
lim inf
n→ Pk is rationalizable≥ e
−kk−1
/2
Proof. Fix k and n. Consider the realizations of k such that, for all m, im
 =jm
 for all ij ∈k.
Then k is rationalizable in MnWn
 by Proposition 2.2. For each such realization of k, form a k×n array ast

by setting ast =smt
. Then, each woman will appear exactly once in each row, because the s are matchings.
Also, each woman will appear at most once in each column, by the assumption that for all m, im
 = jm

for all ij ∈k. The resulting array thus forms a Latin rectangle (see, e.g., Denes and Keedwell [5]).
Thus, there are as many realizations of k in the hypothesis of Proposition 2.2 as there are k × n Latin
rectangles. In turn, Erdös and Kaplanski [9] proved that, as n→, the number of k× n Latin rectangles is
asymptotic to
n!
ke−k2
 (7)
On the other hand, an arbitrary realization of k forms an array where each woman appears exactly once
in each row, but may be repeated in columns. Therefore, each row is a permutation of the women, and there
are as many k as ways of making k permutations, that is, n!
k. The probability, then, of a draw of k in the
hypothesis of Proposition 2.2, is asymptotic to e−
k
2
, which gives the result. 
4 One could also consider bargaining sets (Klijn and Massó [12], Echenique and Oviedo [7]).
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As we remarked above, the message in Proposition 8.1 is probably not surprising, but hopefully it illustrates
a potential for statistical applications of the rationalizability results developed in the paper. The proof of the
proposition builds on the very crude sufficient condition for rationalizability in Proposition 2.2 of §2. There is
clearly potential for refining this result.
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